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Introduction
Through an economical and political perspective, this paper examines the trend pattern, the sector and the
geographical distribution of the Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Portugal’s overseas territories (or
Provinces) from 1958 until 1974, and in its mainland from 1960 until 1999.
Studies of the Japanese FDI in Portugal are practically non−existent. As far as it is known, only one (the
industrial development of the Aveiro−Viseu region in 1992) has been carried out. However, this study was
aimed to formulate a comprehensive plan with a view to vitalize and modernize the Portuguese national
economy having in mind the attraction of Japanese investment mainly after Portugal’s access to the EEC in
1986. This paper studies the investment trends such as the level of interest and the desire of the Japanese
companies to invest in Portugal after the second World War until 1999. Having this in mind, this paper provides
a historical and a statistical support with up dated data regarding to the present situation of the Japanese FDI
inflows in Portugal.
The analysis of the Japanese FDI in the Portuguese former colonies and in its mainland is based on original
documents available at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Portugal. Regarding to the Japanese investment from
1975 until 1999, the most important resources for this paper were as follows : Portuguese Foreign Trade and
Investment Institute (ICEP−Investimento, Comércio e Turismo de Portugal), Japan External Trade Organization
(JETRO), OECD records as well as a study made by the Japan International Cooperation Agency as a request of
the Portuguese government in which the investments trends of Japanese companies with regard to Portugal were
examined.
The paper outline is the following one : section 1 discusses the motives for Japanese investment in
Portuguese overseas territories from 195８ until 1974, as a trade and FDI destiny. Section 2 analyses the
importance of the EEC as a factor to attract Japanese FDI, the Japanese FDI behaviour in Portugal from 1960
until 1999, and Japan’s investment strategy in Portugal within the context of globalization. Section 3 focuses on
the Japanese MNC in Portugal and on the majority or minority ownership of Japanese affiliate companies in
Portugal for their trade performance and its interaction with FDI within a list of the 100 biggest export and
import companies established in Portugal in 1998 and 1999. Finally, section 4 provides the conclusion remarks.
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1. Japanese FDI in Portugal’s overseas territories
From 1945 until 1957, Portuguese overseas territories did not receive any Japanese investments, as Japan’s
main objective was not to invest but to make trade. As a result, the Japanese investment started in 1958 and was
extended until 1974. Furthermore, Japan’s aims were not oriented towards the Portuguese mainland market but
to the overseas territories in Africa and Asia (East Timor and India) due to their rich natural resources,
especially the iron ore from Goa (Portuguese India), and the important markets for trade, in Angola, the
Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique. However, the Portuguese restrictions, such as the caution in celebrating a
trade agreement with Japan (signed in 1966), forced Japan to assume another strategy to try to circumvent the
tariffs and non−tariff barriers to trade. On the other hand, Portugal realized that it did not possess enough
economic power to develop the colonies. Japan soon understood Portugal’s need of capital, and asked for a
share in the board’s firms provided that it would be allowed to have trade relations with the Portuguese overseas
territories where the investments were to be made. This was Japan’s condition to invest in the colonies.
Fundamentally, the total FDI inflows to Portuguese overseas territories, between 1962 and 1968 were the
double (288 US$ million dollars to the overseas territories) if compared to its mainland (119 US$ million
dollars), which was mainly due to the vast natural resources of Portugal’s overseas territories (United Nations
Yearbook, 1968, p.528 ; 1969, p. 511 ; 1970, p. 552 respectively).
Yet, if in some cases Japan’s investments in the overseas territories were accomplished, it did not happen the
way the Japanese government wanted to. In other words, the FDI regime was not free from obstacles because of
two reasons : First, at that time, the Portuguese protectionist policy based on the Colonial Act (July 1930) made
foreign investments highly unlikely1. This distrust towards FDI is an example on how the capital nationalization
law controlled, and in some cases banned investment from certain key industries. It should be noted that this
Law was never applied in the colonies. Additionally, the participation of foreign capital in national companies of
overseas territories was free. Nonetheless, at that time the ideal policy for the Portuguese government was the
absence of any foreign capital (MNE−Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros−in English−MNE−Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 1964, p. 1).2
The Japanese investment in the overseas territories came to a halt because of the territories independence after
the Revolution in 1974. Consequently, Japan’s awareness in Portugal decreased, almost vanishing, as its main
1 The Act brought the colonies under tighter control from Lisbon and encouraged trade between the metropolis and the colonies by
providing increased protection for Portuguese goods and by placing restrictions on the export of raw materials from the colonies,
including cotton, minerals, sugar and oil. In contrast to the situation prevailing under the First Republic, colonial autonomy came to
an end with Salazar. In 1951, the colonies were reclassified as overseas provinces. Imperial economic policy was based in the
premise that the colonies should furnish the raw materials while in return the metropolis supplied the material goods. See Corkill
(1993, p.6) ; and Corkill (1999, p. 12, 13).
2 Concerning to the FDI regime, for the Portuguese overseas territories, the requirement of national capital is only valid in the case of
the Article 7 (Decree 28.228 of November 24, 1937) which states that only in the base of land concession, the clause of 51.0% of
national capital is applicable. In special cases, the Ministry of Ultramar (Overseas Territories) has competence, heard the Ultramar
Council to exempt the observance of those conditions. In Diário Carioca , MNE, Lisboa, 1964.
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interest was in the colonies natural resources and markets. At the same time, it can be stated that the Japanese
investments were highly beneficial to the overseas territories economies as the investments contributed to the
development of their local infrastructures. Consequently１, these investments would contribute to shift the
production from labour intensive goods to more complex capital−intensive manufactures. Ultimately, the
Japanese objective was to export a large part of their output back to Japan or to third countries, thus enlarging
the trade between them. According to the Kojima trade oriented Japanese model, the choice was not so much
between exporting and investing abroad, but between investment through joint−ventures or economic
cooperation (in the case of the Portuguese colonies due to legal impediments) to expand the market share
(Kojima, 1993, p. 220−224). Then, the FDI was pro−trade oriented, i. e. trade−creating (Suzuki, 1989, p. 152).
This explains the imbalance between Japan’s outward and inward FDI that remained until the 1980s.
Afterwards, the Japanese outward FDI increased due to the appreciation of the yen. The trade friction with the
EEC motivated the switch of investment from a regional to a global scale, as the Japanese investments were
principally concentrated in the main three core regions (Europe, ASEAN, and USA) of the global economy
comprising from commercial activities to production investment (Hook, 1998, p. 29, 35). Still, regarding to
Japanese investment in Portugal, the appreciation of the yen did not seem to be the main motif to FDI, but lower
labour costs in comparison to other European countries.
1.1 The Japanese Investment in the Portuguese India (Goa)
After the Second World War, Japan’s balance of trade fell into deficit. Consequently, in 1950, the Japanese
government issued the first economic plan aiming to the modernization of industrial plants, the promotion of
foreign trade and the reduction of dependence on foreign imports. The fact is that Japan’s economic growth was
subject to recurrent balance of payments constraints (El−Agraa, 1988, p. 69). For that reason, Japan’s foreign
exchange position had been fragile until the late 1960’s and direct investments overseas were officially
discouraged in almost all areas except that of raw material extraction to ensure the success of its exports
(Pempel, 1977, p. 745, 751). In fact, this condition was present in the case of Goa (Portuguese India). So,
Japanese investment began by the end of the 1950’s, and like in the other Portuguese colonies, it was much
more a precondition to create trade flows rather than the true desire of making investments.
In fact, the interest of Japan towards the iron ore of Goa (Portuguese India, occupied by India in 1961) was
enormous, and it is within this context that the Japanese investments in Goa and other Portuguese overseas
territories were assessed. According to some documents, the interest of Japan towards Goa might have had
started at the beginning of the 1950’s when a Japanese financier had agreements with Goan industrialists for
exploitation of manganese and iron mines in the Portuguese colonies. A considerable amount of Japanese capital
was also sunk into the development and mechanization of some of the mines (Ministério dos Negócios
Estrangeiros−MNE−in English−Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1958a, p. 1).
On the other hand, the importance of iron sales was as high to the economy of Goa as to Japan’s economy. In
1957, the total amount of iron ore exported from Goa accounted 610,000 escudos (PTE−Portuguese escudos),
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from which 250,000 escudos were directed to the Japanese market. The importance assumed by Japanese
investment in the economic development of the Portuguese India resulted from the fact that the extraction and
exportation of the iron ore from Goa was the outcome of the Japanese financial support and technical expertise :
their geological and mining prospect, the mechanic supply to the most important mines and even the
construction of a new quay in the port of Mormugão , having the same financial and technical support. It is
worth to mention that Japan’s position as an importer of iron ore was the highest among Germany, Italy,
Austria, France, Czechoslovakia, Holland and the UK, thus considered of vital economical importance for the
State of India (Portugal). Therefore, the Ministry of Ultramar was very interested in keeping it (MNE, 1958,
p.22, 23 ; and, MNE, 1958b).
This was acknowledged by the ministry of overseas (in Portuguese−Ministério do Ultramar), that for the well
being and defense of the State of India’s economy, the relations between Portugal and Japan would be
reinforced, since Japan was the first purchaser of iron ore in Goa and was interested in strengthening this
relation in order to recover the investments already done (MNE, 1958a, cit. p. 26).
1.2 Concerning to the investments in the Portuguese Guinea
Portugal was particularly interested in seeking Japanese cooperation for the development of agriculture,
fishery and mineral resources in the colony. Portugal reportedly wanted Japan to put about 30 million yens in
funds (In : Asahi Evening News , cited by MNE, 1957a). Indeed, the SCOFAI Development Company (in
Portuguese−Sociedade Comercial de Fomento Agrícola e Industrial SCOFAI, S. A. R. L) after the diligences
through the delegation of Japan in Lisbon asked the Taiyo Gyogyo Kabushiki Gaisha and Taiyo Fishery firms
whether they would be interested or not in having a 40.0% share participation in the capital in SCOFAI
Portugal, while by that time, it had also the exclusive representation of Toyota Motor Sales Co. The main
activities of SCOFAI were focused on the development of Guinea especially regarding to the exploitation of
oleaginouses, ore, cellulose, sugar cane, bananas and cattle breed.
Beyond the main reason of SCOFAI, which was to expand its operations to the Japanese market, thus
interested in having Japanese capital in their capital, there were other reasons such as : Japan’s presence in the
Portuguese market could function as an attraction to pull into Portugal other industrial representations whose
centres in the Iberian Peninsula tended to be established in Spain. Also the Japanese know−how and
collaboration was fundamental to assemble several industry plants in Guinea such as mine extraction plant of
cassiterite, pulp plant and a canned tunny plant in the Bijagós Island (MNE, 1957b, p. 1−2). At that time, (first
reason) Portugal was already in risk to be absorbed by the bigger market of Spain due to the Spanish better
geographic location, for example as a base for their international expansion because some foreign firms were
already establishing their subsidiaries in Spain and were used as platforms for trade with Portugal.
At that time, Japan’s interest lay in the fact that it did not have co−participation in any other Portuguese firms,
while England, France, United States and Belgium already did. By distributing many Portuguese and colonial
products to other countries, Japan could have enough foreign currencies for import purpose. By doing this, it
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allowed the firms to receive the largest possible quantity of materials from Japan to be distributed through the
whole Portuguese empire.
On the other hand, Japan was aware of the development of the mentioned industries in the Portuguese Guinea
that would contribute powerfully for the expansion of the Japanese products since a law under study would
establish Customs liberty and equality for all Portuguese overseas territories. In fact, in 1962, the law that was
approved by Salazar, established an integration policy of the various regions (Espaço económico nacional), in
order to create a market as large as possible for national producers.3 As a consequence, many of the products
imported from Guinea could be re exported to any part of the Japanese territory without paying any further
custom duties (MNE, 1957c, p. 1−2).
In sum, the Japanese investment helped the firm by facilitating the improvement of the exports of the home
country through the provision of capital goods, and then, intermediate inputs to the foreign subsidiaries of the
parent companies established in the colony.
From 1960 onwards, Portugal’s FDI regime became more liberal. In part, this was a consequence of the
membership of European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) and also due to the guarantees given to foreign
investment under Decree Law No. 46412 of April 28th, 1965. However, the EFTA treaty did not apply to the
overseas provinces. Still, the special treatment within EFTA gave the Portuguese industrial goods duty free
access to a market of over 100 million consumers, that with the lower labour costs allowed Portugal to have
costs of 30.0 to 40.0% lower than in Central and Northern European industrial countries (Banco Português do
Atlântico, 1965, p. 2, 5).
In this climate of improved openness, in 1962, Portugal created the Foundation of Technical Cooperation to
Overseas (in Portuguese : Fundação de Cooperação Técnica no Ultramar) to match the Japanese wishes for
strengthening the economic and technical cooperation with Portugal. The Portuguese Foundation was to execute
itself, or through the Technical and Construction International Foundation of Japan (created in 1957), researches
or other projects to improve the national economy with Japanese capital. Specifically, the Technical and
Construction International Foundation of Japan was created with the objective to promote the technical and
economical cooperation in the less developed countries as Metropolitan Portugal or overseas territories with the
expenses of the Japanese authorities. It is worth to remark that this assistance did not preclude any kind of
political pressure or foreign control. However, it was Japan’s desire that those projects, either in infrastructures
for public works or social providence, would be of such nature that they would contribute to the economic
enrichment between Japan and Portugal (MNE, 1962, p. 1−2).
3 Concerning to the taxation aspects of the Policy of National Integration, the various regions, home and overseas, constituting
Portuguese territory involves the abolition of customs duties previously levied to protect local production. Accordingly, after 1962
Metropolitan Portugal had to abolish all import and export duties levied on its trade with its overseas provinces ; the abolition was
enforced at a single stroke for each commodity, but the fact that it was not enforced at the same time for all commodities ensured that
the reduction was gradual. Regarding to the overseas provinces, the period wherein abolition of customs duties was longer than for
Metropolitan Portugal, namely 10 years. Nevertheless, for certain less important commodities, the abolition was implemented from
the outset. See Banco Português do Atlântico, (1965, p. 50).
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1. 3 Concerning to the territories of Angola, Mozambique and East Timor
For several years, Portugal’s dictatorial regime was not completely in favour to allow national or foreign
capital to be invested in these territories, thus delaying the numerous possibilities of foreign investment in
railroads, road building, construction, port development, as well as agricultural, fishing and mining projects,
urgent needs for local population (MNE, 1956, p. 13).
Unfortunately, despite the moderate and favorable tax regime which permitted investments either to
Mozambique or to Angola, the foreign investment was almost inexistent. As far as it is known some investments
such as the following ones were made. On October 27th, 1958 the Nichimen Jitsugyo Kabushiki Gaisha formerly
Japan Cotton & General Trading Co., Ltd informed the Ministry of Overseas in Lisbon, the wish to supply 8,332
pieces of steel rails and relating accessories for the Mozamedes Railway Company to serve the mining region of
Cassinga in the Angolan Province. The deal was accepted (MNE, 1958c, p. 1). In addition, the Japanese capital
was used to build a new railway, nearly 100 miles in length connecting the mines of Namapa with the port of
Nacala (Banco de Fomento Nacional, 1968, p. 19).
Some years later, in 1967, a Japanese firm, Nittetsu Mining Company, requested the Portuguese government a
geological survey concerning to the extraction of mineral resources with a double objective : first, to make a
contribution to the development of the Mozambique Province, and second, to profit through the development of
mineral resources. Regarding to the shape of business, the Japanese company was open to joint ventures, to
offers of equipment or technical services to any Portuguese firm (MNE, 1967b, p. 1−2). Another Japanese firm,
Sumitomo Co. invested US$50 million dollars in the exploitation of mineral resources (iron ore) in Mirrote ,
Mozambique Province (MNE, 1967c, p. 1).
Taking into account the given examples, it is evident that Japanese firms were highly interested in the
Portuguese colonies due to the vast possibilities of investment. In fact, Portugal was becoming aware of the
importance of Japanese private investment in the development of the overseas territories as it was evident that
the economic power of Portugal alone would never be enough to develop the territories. This was the main
objective of the Commercial Mission to Japan (Tokyo and Osaka) made by Portuguese exporters and importers
in 1973. The fact that Portugal had already a free−trade agreement with the EEC (signed in 1972) was offering a
favourable timing for Japanese entrepreneurs that in a near future were able to establish themselves in Portugal
and produce goods as long as they respected the rules demanded by the European Community (MNE,
Portuguese−Japanese Chamber, 1973, p. 2−3).
The Portuguese desire to receive Japanese investments was officially expressed through the promotion
campaigns in the Portuguese Trade Office of the Portuguese embassy in Tokyo concerning to the trade
promotion of wines and other products of Portugal. Investment was not forgot, as the Portuguese ambassador,
Mr. Coutinho said : “We shall also not spare ourselves to induce potential enterprises of Japan to invest in
Portugal in every possible industrial field ” (MNE, 1974a, p. 2).
The main obstacle for the Portuguese overseas territories for expanding their exports to Japan lay in the
insufficiency of their productive structures, due to the scarcity of technological know−how, engineering
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expertise, technical expertise and entrepreneurial management. Therefore, at that time as well as nowadays, the
importance of the contribution of FDI for the development of the host economy through partnership in joint
ventures involving private and foreign capital with the positive effects on the local economy was acknowledged.
Nevertheless, contacts made between representatives of powerful Japanese companies signalled some
impediments to the investment in the territories. In particular, it was mentioned that the Japanese companies
were not benefiting from the special conditions of credit authorized by the Japanese government in relation to
the foreign direct investments in developing countries if those were to be directed to Portuguese overseas
territories. The Ministry of Ultramar did not confirm if this measure was applied or not, if this was the case, it
would go against the spirit and aim of the Luso−Japanese economic cooperation. Moreover, Japan granted the
Portuguese overseas territories the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for countries in development
(MNE, 1974b, and p. 1−4). Nonetheless, the Portuguese embassy came to know in relation to the territory of
East Timor that Japan did not have any plans to make investments. Besides, the Government of Tokyo was
denying the authorization to Japanese investments in the Portuguese Overseas or Ultramar. In addition, the
credits to Japanese exports from the EXIMP Bank were also suspended. These facts could be related to the
political and economic instability due to the civil wars in several territories that could threat all investments.
Thus, it was wiser to take a preventive approach and deny the investment than authorizing it and then in turn
making it difficult or impossible to be recovered (MNE, 1974c, p. 1).
It cannot be assured whether this double Japanese policy was true or not, however, the sudden collapse of the
empire as a consequence of the end of the regime in April 1974 can justify it partially. One thing is right, as a
consequence of the revolution in Portugal, Japanese investment in the Portuguese former−colonies decreased if
not stopped due to the civil war eruption from the former ex. colonies, and not due to the fact that they became
independent, even if Portugal was ready to be a mediator between the new−independent states and Japan,
facilitating diplomatic contacts between them.
2. Japanese FDI in Portugal
In 1960, the Japanese investment started in relation to the mainland of Portugal. The strategy chosen by
Japanese investors was to make join−ventures with Portuguese partners. Some companies became cases of
success such the chemical plant Cires (in Portuguese−Companhia Industrial de Resinas Sintéticas), a joint
Portuguese−Japanese concern at Estarreja near Oporto, which started to produce in 1960, the Mitsui & Co
(import / export) in 1968, the Salvador Caetano (Toyota automobile assembly) in 1972, or FISIPE (synthetic
fiber group Mitsubishi) in 1973. These were the cases with more success of the Japanese investment in Portugal.
However, after this auspicious start, Japanese investment decreased in part due to internal and external causes,
such as the revolution in April 25, 1974, with all its social, economic and political consequences, whereas the
worst of them was perhaps the nationalization of the Portuguese private sector and the two−oil crisis. Then, with
the faster liberalization of FDI legislation in other countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany and France,
２０３Analysis of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in Portugal and its Overseas Territories
－２５－
Portugal was left outside of the forefront of host countries to FDI at least until the mid 1980’s.
In 1986, the Japanese companies became aware of Portugal as a good location to FDI because of the
country’s access to the European Community. In fact, as a result of EEC access, Portugal had to comply its
internal legislation with the Community legislation that gave freedom of feasible establishment, pushing the
liberalization and deregulation of the economy with all the inherent market consequences (Martins, 2000, p. 95).
As a result, FDI inflows in Portugal experienced a marked growth after 1986. On the other hand, just before the
access to the EEC, Portugal took more determined steps towards Japan, considering it a priority target of the
Portuguese economy as well as political diplomacy. The reason lay behind the need of Portugal to be able to
insert itself within the new flows of capital, advanced technology and trade (Gama, 1985, p. 159).
Notwithstanding the important progress in liberalizing the FDI regime, Portugal’s reform programme was
cautious and gradual, as non−EEC firms were treated differently from their EC counterparts under the safeguard
clause of Portugal’s 1986 Foreign Investment Law (Regulatory Decree Number 26 / 86 of 18 July 1986).
Certainly, this safeguard clause had some negative consequences in the inflows of investment from Japan into
Portugal at least until 1993, when the FDI regime was changed into a more liberal one (Regulatory−Decree
No.17 / 93), as the projects were now evaluated on the same basis for EEC and non−EEC investors (OECD,
1994, p. 8, 36).4
So, Portugal’s attractive internal factors such as the low labour costs, the attitude of local authorities towards
Japanese investment, as well as incentives and promotional campaigns from public bodies were vital to attract
FDI inflows. Concerning to the external factors, the interest towards Portugal was not accidental, as almost at
the same time, the European Single Market became one of the main decisive factors for Japanese investors
selecting a location within the European Union (EU) as the investors realized the enormous potential growth for
their companies.
In part, Portugal’s relatively autárchical economy and non−competitive production structure can explain why
Japanese investment remained so low until 1985. Yet, other reasons such as the following ones can be pointed
out (DGCE, 1993, p. 35−36) :
 Long periods of political instability and a precarious situation of the Portuguese economy, with high levels of
inflation.
 Small internal market and geographically distant from the main production plants, as well as distribution and
consumption centers in Europe.
 Insufficient and deficient communications infrastructures, in the case of roads, and other factors vital to
industry.
 Difficulties to obtain in the national market components with the quality demanded to incorporate in the
4 This Foreign Investment Law provided that investment by non−EEC firms could be subject to assessment and negotiation depending
on the investment’s effect on Portugal’s economy. Investment by EEC firms was not subject to this safeguard clause.
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products.
 A lack of orientation in the Portuguese industrial policy in the immediate post EEC accession.
 Bureaucratic difficulties emerged during the implementation of previous Japanese investments, thus creating
an image necessary to overcome.
 Language barrier (difficulties to hire Japanese technicians with knowledge of the Portuguese language).
 Legal restrictions, which hindered the influx of foreign capital into sectors considered strategic, thus not
managing to offer the enough returns and investment risks, with some exceptions, required by Japanese
investors.
 Difficulties in promoting an effective policy to attract FDI. These and other factors, such as the fear of being
controlled from outside contributed to discourage FDI outflows by non−EU countries like Japan.
2. 1 Japanese FDI behaviour in Portugal (1960−1999)
As it is seen in Figure 1, total Japanese FDI flows in Portugal can be clearly classified into two distinct
periods.
The first one is from 1960 until 1984, just before the Portugal’s access to the EEC. This period was
characterized by a very rigid legislation and irregularity in investments that had their peak in 1968 and 1984
with 17 US$ and 11 US$ million dollars respectively, although falling to 1 US$ million dollars in 1986.
The second one goes from 1985 until the present days. Since Portugal’s access (in 1986) to the EEC, the
volume of investment increased drastically, reaching a new peak in 1990 with 69US$ million, whereas the most
important investment came from Mitsubishi Trucks Europe , in Tramagal (production of vehicles Mitsubishi
Canter). Between 1991 and 1993, the total Japanese investment in Portugal began to wane, a fall that can be
linked to the weakness in the international economic situation, as well as to the burst of the financial bubble in
Japan in 1991 ; however it recovered after 1994, thus keeping a constant level until 1999.
Graph 1 Japan FDI inflows in Portugal, 1960−1999 (Unit : US$ million dollars)
Source: Foreign Investment Institute (1988) ; Bank of Portugal (1972, 1973, 1975, 1978, 1979, 1982),
Report of the Board of the Directors, and OECD records (1993, 1998, 2000).
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Table−1 Attractiveness of Portugal for investment
No. of companies ％
1. More information needed for evaluation 140 70.0
2. Not attractive as−investment opportunity 45 22.5
3. Attractive(deserving−further consideration) 15 7.5
Total 200 100.0
Source : Japan International Cooperation Agency, 1992.
In sum, since 1960 until 1999, Japanese FDI inflows represented only 1.2% of the total inflows invested in
Portugal. In fact, in the 1960s there were only two Japanese firms (chemical sector, and export / import
respectively) established in Portugal. In the 1970s (until 1973), this number rose to 4 firms, and until 1986, the
number of Japanese firms established in Portugal increased only to 5 firms. However, in 1990, there were
already 11 manufacturing companies, and by the year 2000, Portugal had 20 factories with Japanese capital,
which ranked Portugal in the 11th place within the 24 European countries that host Japanese FDI.
Between 1960 and 1999, Japanese FDI totaled 269US$ million dollars. Despite its small level, Japanese
investment had been increasing throughout the period. It should be noted that an agreement of double tax
contribution between the two nations has not been yet concluded despite the efforts of both governments. As a
result, some investments of Japanese companies with origin in Japan were made through their companies−
affiliates located in countries with which Portugal as well as Japan had reached agreements as Pioneer and
Siemens / Matsushita (ICEP, 2001)5.
According to Mr. Natsuki Nakazawa, JETRO’s Lisbon Director, the main reason that justifies the absence of
Japanese investment is the fact that most of the Japanese companies do not know the country due to the lack of
information (Luso−Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1999, p.8). This conclusion is the same as
one achieved in a survey (1992), on how Japanese industries regard investment in Portugal , by a Japanese team
at the request of the Portuguese government. At the time, and looking at Table 1, the study confirmed the overall
feeling of Japanese companies on the attractiveness of investment in Portugal, yet 70.0% of the 200 companies
surveyed declared, more information needed for evaluation .
From 1960 until the present time, the Portuguese foreign investment in Japan has not been relevant. As far as
it is known, in 1990 it totaled 7 million escudos (sector of retail and gross commerce, restaurants and hotels), in
1996, 6 million escudos (industry sector), and in 1998 it hardly reached the 23 million escudos. Before the
1990’s, only one firm, Hovione Japan Ltd . (pharmaceutical products) established itself in Japan. Recently,
another firm Portugal Trade Corporation , has also been established itself in Japan (D. G. R. E. I, 1997, p. 37 ;
and D. G. C. E., 1993, p. 37−38).
5 In the year 2002, “there was at least two Japanese investments in Portugal. The first investment was from the Tayo Engineering in
Setu¯bal through the Singapore’s affiliate. The second investment was from Olympus in Coimbra through the European Olympus
affiliate”. See Batista, (2002).
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2. 2 Japanese investment strategy in Portugal within the regional and global process
Despite the higher investment inflows in the 1990s in comparison with the previous decade, Japanese
investment has played a minor role in Portugal if compared to the total Portugal inflows of FDI (see Graph 2).
To explain this tendency, the two types of Japanese investment strategy should be evaluated. The A−type is
characterized by a strategy of factor seeking FDI , looking for low cost qualified labour and market seeking
investment to increase the market share. The B−type of Japanese investment is characterized by technological
links as a result of the two way foreign investments, within a rationalized (and efficiency seeking) and strategic
asset seeking investment towards the more developed and technological endowed countries (Dunning, 1992,
p.350−353).
Regarding to the A−type, two reasons can be mentioned. First, the Japanese industry expanded its role in East
Asia and Central Europe, thus promoting a new form of regionalism intended to rationalize and reorganize
manufacturing bases in the context of their global strategies, motivated by cheaper labour costs as well as lower
production costs, and a deeper development of their ties with local markets (Basu and Miroshnik, 2000, p.61).
As a consequence, after the mid−1990s the delocalization of important Japanese investments towards the
Central and European Eastern Countries (CEEC) represent to Portugal a special challenge as its combined
policy−induced integration6, highly skilled workers and additional FDI incentives are already giving them
advantages over Portugal.
Concerning to the B−type, there is a sign of direct mutual learning as the investment is engaged much more
towards the core countries of Europe, with high per capita income and / or large populations than to the
periphery of Europe. This investment is also heavily engaged with R&D centers. As an example, the United
Kingdom has 128 R & D centers against 70 in Germany, 61 in France, 30 in Spain and 5 in Portugal (see Table
2). As a consequence, Japan’s lack of interest in the Portuguese economy is explained by the reduced dimension
of the national market as well as the technological gap that Portugal maintains in relation to Japan, for example
in the electronic domain which is one of the main sectors of Japanese investment in Europe, but that has been
absent in Portugal. Second, the preference of the bigger Spanish domestic market with better infrastructure and
human technological support, and also closer to the center of Europe, attracts relatively large volumes of
Japanese FDI than Portugal.
In sum, it can be said that Portugal embraces two types of investment (factor and market−seeking until the
1990s but recently changing towards a rationalized and efficiency seeking) less orientated to the domestic
market and more export−orientated than before. In other words, the same reasons, (i. e. the market unification
due to the fear of actual / or potential trade barriers, and lower production costs) that took Japan between 1983
and 1990 to rely on local producing in the EC and Portugal, are now in the wake of the EU enlargement, the
6 The process of the policy−induced integration, i. e., the integration supported by the special EA (Europe Association Agreements)
signed between the EU and the CEECs recognize that the ultimate goal of CEEC signatories of the EA is the full membership in the
European Union. The process is similar to that of enlargement of regional agreements through the access of Greece, Portugal and
Spain. See : Kaminsky (2000, p. 1−3).
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same reasons that boosted the Japanese investment towards the Eastern European Countries, thus presenting the
main challenge concerning to the attraction of Japanese direct investment to Portugal.
2. 3 Sector, typological and geographic characteristics of Japanese Investment in Portugal
At the present time, there are 20 factories in Portugal with Japanese capital. The distribution of Japanese FDI
has been centered on the industrial sector, which has earlier enjoyed a more liberal foreign investment
legislation for non−EU investors outside the service sector. As part of the integration process of Portugal to the
European Community a gradual liberalisation of the FDI regime took place. To non−EEC investors like Japan
the safeguard clause restrictions to investments (until 1993) could generally get around by investing from an
EEC base.
Japanese investment in Portugal follows the same pattern as investments in the industrial sector in the United
Kingdom, France and Germany, which are characterised by high concentration in a small number of industries,
such as chemical industry, metal products, electrical industry, electronics industry, transport machinery and
transport machinery components. Within the tertiary sector, there is a limited presence of financial institutions.
Table 2 shows several characteristics of the Japanese investment in Portugal since 1960 until 1999.
The sector analysis reveals that Japanese FDI in Portugal is larger in the trade & services (distribution, import
/ export, marketing), which accounted 58.0% of the total invested. Moreover, presence in the industrial sector is
headed by investments in four important sectors : the car industry with 14.5%, the textile industry with 7.8%,
the chemical industry with 6.5%, and last with less weight, the electric / electronics industry with 3.3% (all
together represent 32.1%) of the total investment in Portugal during the period 1960−1999.
Concerning to the total share of the Japanese capital in the finance and intermediation as well as restaurant
and hotel activities, it accounted 100.0% of the total invested, followed by the food industry with 99.9%. Then,
the electronic industry obtains 79.5%, which is followed by the trade & services with 78.7%, and the car
industry with 71.4% shared in the total capital investment.
Graph 2 FDI inflows into Portugal, 1960−1999
Note : World Inflows = right side and Japan inflows = left side.
Source: Foreign Investment Institute (1988) ; Matos (1973) ; Bank of Portugal (1972, 1973, 1975, 1978, 1979, 1982) Report of the
Board of the Directors, and OECD records (1993, 1998, 2000).
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Regarding to the remaining activities of the service sector such as public services (water, gas, electricity), real
estate or financial service companies, the number of Japanese companies is almost zero. In the case of the public
administration, leisure, education and health sector mentioned in Table 2, it is non−existent, except for the
Fundação Moa de Portugal (education and training) established in 1988. Then, the real estate activities and
financial bodies constitute the sectors where Japanese interest has been weaker, partly due to the delay (only in
March 1988) to reform the previous Portuguese legislation for banking establishments nationalized after 1974.
In addition, until recently (1995), the Portuguese bank system did not have enough critical mass or size to be
competitive in Europe. The small domestic market means that even if there was a single market−monopoly, it
would not be amongst the largest in Europe, therefore not attractive for Japanese investors (Corkill, 1999,
p.145). Another reason may be the limited possibilities offered by the Japanese market due to the low import or
export business financing operations or the small number of big Portuguese companies not enough to cover the
financial risks to the Japanese banks.
According to the data gathered, it is also possible to analyze the characteristics, structure and size of the 65
companies with investment in Portugal. Of the nearly 13,962 employees, 129 are Japanese. The majority of
these Japanese employees is working in the car industry (47 employees), followed by trade & services (26
employees), and the electronic industry with 22 employees (see Table 2).
When analyzing the companies sector composition, it is important to know their location as most of the times
FDI searches for highly qualified labour force as well as productive structure, and a strong industrial base. In
total, there are actually 65 companies established in Portugal. However, the location is available only for 47
Table−2 Japanese Investment and R & D centers in Portugal,1960−1999
INDUSTRY / ACTIVITY
* Capital
invested
Total capital
invested (%)
Japanese
capital (%)
Total of
employees
Japanese
employed
Number of
companies
R & D
Centers
Car industry 18,362,000 14.5 71.4 9712 47 9
chemical industry 8,276,000 6.5 42.7 843 3 5 2
Food industry(fishery) 5,000 0.0 99.9 27 3 2
Electrical & Electronics industry 4,223,000 3.3 79.5 947 22 6 1
Forestry / Paper 8,820,000 6.9 23.0 184 2 2
Textile industry 9,869,000 7.8 69.1 794 5 3
Industry / Construction 4,000 0.0 20.0 16 3 2
Trade & Services 73,571,000 58.0 78.7 1031 26 25
Real Estate activities 160,000 0.1 57.5 17 2 3
Finance intermediation 3,500 0.0 100 17 3 1
Restaurants and Hotels 3,650,000 2.9 100 374 8 2
Public administration, leisure,
education, and health
8 2
Others 1
Total 126,943,500 100 67.4 13,962 129 65 5
* Unit : PTE = Portuguese Escudos
1. Present state of the Japanese investment in Portugal.
2. Regarding to “Capital invested” as well as for the “Japanese capital percentage”, data are not available for all the companies.
Source : ICEP (2001) and JETRO (17th Survey), 2000.
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companies, from which 24 are concentrated in the city of Lisbon, 8 in the Lisbon area, followed by 1 company
in Porto’s city and 11 more in the Porto area. In the Center of Portugal, only 2 Japanese companies are
established, and only one company in the South. It should be noticed that Japanese and Portugal FDI is mostly
concentrated in these two regions, Lisbon in the center−south, and Porto in the north of Portugal. It is also a fact
that these regions have higher levels of per capita and per worker income with a productive structure based on
industrial activities and the service sector. In general, most of the Japanese companies established in the
northern region considered the following factors as the reasons for their choice : First, labour costs were lower
when compared to the southern regions ; second, the region was designated for investment incentives ; and
third, the active policies undertaken by the local government (Japan International Cooperation Agency−JICA,
1992, p. 23).
3. Japanese MNC in Portugal
The interest of countries such as Japan in Portugal goes back to the 1960s when CIRES (chemical industry)
made a joint Portuguese−Japanese concern at Estarreja near Porto. This joint venture was established after the
new Portuguese Import Tariff in November 1959, based on the common Brussels nomenclature that came into
effect. Special reference should be made to such measures as drawbacks, and various exemptions and reductions
of import duties, aiming to develop the Portuguese industry and the promotion of exports, from which Japanese
investment could take advantage (Banco Português do Atlântico, 1965, p.49). The Mitsui & Co (trade firm) was
established in Portugal in 1968.
The 1970’s were not particularly strong years in relation to the Japanese investment counting only 4 firms.
The Itocho Co . in 1971 (trade firm), and Brother International (electric equipment distribution) in 1971 with
26.3% Japanese share ; Toyota in 1972 with 27.0% share in the Group Salvador Caetano (car industry), and in
1973 the FISIPE (manufacturing of acrylic fibres) owned in 21.0% by Mitsubishi . Then the Revolution, in
1974, brought serious costs to the attraction of FDI, including Japanese investment in Portugal (ICEP ; Data
Bank 2000−JETRO and JETRO 1996 and 1999). Although Japanese investment was never at risk in Portugal
before or after the revolution, the fact is that the inflows decreased to a considerable extent. As a consequence,
only after the 1980’s, especially from 1985 onwards, the bulk of Japanese investment was visible. This is easily
explained by the Portuguese accession to the EEC, giving the necessary confidence and conditions to foreign
investors. In the 1980’s, companies such as Yoshida Kogyo Co . (textiles) and Yasaki Corporation (manufacture
of wire harness for cars), Dainippon Ink (chemical), Settsu (paper), Honda (distribution), Aoki (restaurant /
hotel), NEC (electronics) were considered the most successful ones.
The 1990’s experienced a continuous expansion of Japanese investment within the primarily targeting
sectors : electrical, electronic car and audio components, chemical and to a lesser extent the financial activities.
The enterprises such as Mitsubishi (manufacture of commercial cars), Nemoto Co ., and Teisan industries (both
chemical), Sanyo (electrical equipment) were among the Japanese investors. In 1992, a survey on the view of
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Table−3 Factors considered to be important / or
concerning to investment in Portugal (% Points)
1. Market size 24.3
2. Technological base and level 22.9
3. Preparation of infrastructure 10.8
4. Intangible factors(language barrier) 10.5
5. National economy(incl. Inflation) 6.5
6. Availability of material parts 5.8
7. Cost factors 5.2
8. Existence of partner & afiliates 5.2
9. Far from Japan(incl. Direct flight) 3.7
10. Political stability 3.4
11. Financing(incl. Interest rate) 1.2
12. Incentives for foreign investment 0.5
Source : Japan International Cooperation Agency, 1992.
Japanese companies in Portugal taken individually as an investment environment and in terms of investment
potential was carried out by the Japan International Cooperation Agency as requested by Portugal (see Table 3).
In this survey, the factors in which most emphasis was given by Japanese companies were the “Market size”
with 24.3% with regard to investment in Portugal, the “technological base and level”, with 22.9% followed by
the “preparation of infrastructures”, with 10.8% and within the intangible factors, the “language barrier” with
10.5%. A large percentage of Japanese companies expressed apprehension about having to use Portuguese
employees to manage factories and supervise personnel in case of investment. The statements above complete a
brief overview of the perception of Japanese companies regarding to Portugal in general about the investment
environment. The distance factor (“far away from Japan, and no direct flight”) was not given any particular
emphasis especially in the case of companies already possessing bases in the EC (JICA, 1992, p.12, 13, 22).
Concerning to the form of investment by the Japanese Multinationals in Portugal, the trend is the increasing
Japanese equity ratio in Portuguese companies throughout the time. This can be explained due to the raise of
Japanese FDI in Europe in the 1980’s and 1990’s, caused by the trade friction between Japan and EC (negative
side), and the cost competitiveness of local production in Western Europe (positive side). In Portugal’s case, the
main motives pointed by the Japanese companies in 1992 were to undertake investment (see Table 4) were as
follows :
The better cost−benefit relation, i. e., lower labour and land costs in comparison with the average of the
European Union, collected 40.9% and 21.8% of the total answers. Concerning to the investment subsidies and
incentives, there are cases in which the investment incentives were given but they were not a direct motivation
for the investor. Yet, those incentives still constituted an important factor in the final decision to invest,
collecting 12.3% of the total answers. About the Portuguese local workforce employed in Japanese companies,
the general view is that, “the workforce is extremely responsible and it fits well with the general ethos of
Japanese companies ; though sometimes workers tend to be slack about time” (JICA, 1992, p. 24).
Other positive investment determinants include the political stability and within the intangible factors, the
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favorable feelings to Japan and to a Japanese presence as well as the complementary national character of the
Portuguese and Japanese people.
Japanese investment in Portugal after the EEC’s access aimed other destinies than the internal market itself. In
the 1960’s and 1970’s, the average of Japanese equity in Portuguese companies was between 20.0% and 30.0%.
Although, after the 1980’s Japanese investment showed a greater interest in the detention of bigger share of
companies assets, thus changing from capital participation to newly established companies. This is the case of
YKK Portugal in 1981 with a 90.0% share in the textiles sector, the Hoya Corporation (Optic sector) in 1983
with a 99.9% share, the Aoki Caesar Hotel with a 100.0% share (Hotel industry), Yasaki−Saltano of Portugal in
1986 with a 90.0% share (electric components for cars), the Nemoto & Co . (chemical) in 1990 with a 85.0%
share, the Uchiyama Portugal in 1996 (manufacturing of rubber and zinc plated bearing seals), and the Fujitsu
in 1997 (manufacture of telecommunication equipment), both with a share of 100.0% just to mention some
cases.
In fact, the Japanese favourite form of investment is changing not only in Portugal but also in Europe.
According to a JETRO survey (1999, p. 14−16), by form of investment, 68.2% of in Europe were newly
established (302 firms out of 443 which gave valid responses), with regard to Portugal share, 75.0% of
conpanies were newey established. The corporate acquisition of Japanese affiliated companies in Europe
accounted 18.3% (81 firms), capital participation for 13.3% (59 firms), and others for 0.2% (one firm). This
change of the form of investment by Japanese companies in Europe could mean that they have more power in
the management processes inside of the companies.
Despite the high level of equity, the number of personnel dispatched from Japan is small in Portugal. In
relation to the employment scale by country, Portugal was found to be at the top in the average number of non−
Japanese administrators and employees at 681.6 people, followed by Central and Eastern Europe with 637
people, and the UK with 405.9 people. With reference to the average number on Japanese employees per firm,
the UK is at the top with 6.0%, followed by Belgium with 4.3%. Portugal has an average number of Japanese
employees per firm of 3.0%, against the EU average of 4.3% (see Table 5).
Therefore, Portuguese executives and managers are employed, and the actual factory administration is under
their responsibility. Consequently, the Japanese style of management is not rigidly enforced but relations with
Table−4 Evaluation of the cost competitiveness of Portugal
Weigthed points ％
1. Labour costs 454 40.9
2. Land cost 242 21.8
3. Subsidies and incentives 136 12.3
4. Raw material costs 113 10.2
5. Transportation costs 86 7.7
6. Tax exemption 49 4.4
7.Utilities costs 30 2.7
Total 1,110 100.0
Source : Japan International Cooperation Agency, 1992.
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business partners are considered to be good.
Other factors that could explain the relatively low share of Japanese investments in the past in Portugal can be
due to the slow decision making process within Japanese companies in comparison to their American
counterparts, or in the past the scarce information available to Japanese companies that certainly played a role.
Also other factors that induce the MNC to enter a new market through Greenfield investment are the structure
of the host market and the nature of the demand (Blomstrom, Kokko and Zejan, 2000, p.43). In addition,
Japanese companies have also come to generate more of their overseas sales through foreign investment rather
than through international trade (Encarnation, 1995, p. 213). This is the case of Portugal, the companies with
higher share were also the ones with bigger quota in the exports and imports. These are big firms, and some of
them were among the list of the 100 Biggest Export and Import Companies in Portugal in 1997 (Economia
Pura , 1999, p.96−103).
Concerning to the exportations, in 1997, Yasaki−Saltano (transport equipment) ranked in the 6thplace within
the 100 biggest export companies in Portugal with 89.0% of exports / sales, towards Germany, France and
Spain, followed in the 26th place by FISIPE (chemical) with 81.4% of exports / sales towards the markets of
Morocco, Italy and Spain. Then, Salvador Caetano ranked in the 48th place with 11.5% of export / sales headed
by Germany, UK, and Spain, and CIRES in the 57thplace with 38.5% of exports / sales directed towards the
markets of Spain, Italy, UK, and Brazil.
In relation to the imports, Salvador Caetano comes in the 9thplace with 82.0% of imports / purchases from
Japan, Thailand, and Germany, followed in the 10thplace by Mitsubishi Motors with 94.8% of the imports /
Table－５ The employment scale of Japanese affiliated companies in Europe and Turkey，１９９９
Country
Non−Japanese Japanese
Number
of
answers
(firm)
Total No.
of
employees
(person)
Average No.
of employees
per firm
(person)
Number
of
answers
(firm)
Total No.
of
employees
(person)
Average No.
of employees
per firm
(person)
The UK 125 50,739 405.9 123 732 6.0
Spain 42 16,118 383.8 39 151 3.9
Portugal 16 10,906 681.6 13 39 3.0
Netherlands 36 10,195 283.2 36 145 4.0
Germany 45 9,822 218.2 42 121 2.9
France 51 8,925 175.0 47 179 3.8
Italy 20 6,587 329.4 17 51 3.0
Ireland 24 3,111 129.6 21 40 1.9
Belgium 18 2,548 141.6 15 64 4.3
Others 16 2,638 164.9 13 38 2.9
Total of Western Europe 393 121,589 309.4 366 1,560 4.3
CEECs 23 14,650 637 23 73 3.2
Turkey 7 3,015 430.7 7 23 3.3
Grand total 423 139,254 329.2 396 1,656 4.2
Source : JETRO Survey, 1999
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Table－６ Markets for Portuguese products
Japanese Companies Aim No. of answers (%) of total
1. EEC market as a whole 175 59.1
2. Portuguese domestic market 68 23.0
3. Develop re−exports to Japan 29 9.8
4. In Portuguese speaking countries 24 8.1
Total 296 100.0
Source : Japan International Cooperation Agency, 1992
purchases from Netherlands, Japan and Thailand. Yasaki−Saltano , the biggest Japanese company in Portugal
with 6,535 workers, imports of 71.3% of its purchases from Japan, Germany and Sweden, and it occupies the
23rd place in the 100 biggest import companies in Portuguese trade and industry in 1997. Then, Honda comes in
the 34thplace (trade passenger cars) with 99.7% of its imports / purchases from UK, Japan and Belgium,
followed by Sony in 39thplace with 46.0% of imports / purchases from Japan, Spain and Belgium. The CIRES
Company is in the 41st place with 91.0% of its imports / purchases from Netherlands, Norway and Germany,
followed by FISIPE in the 67th place and with 80.0% of its imports from Germany and France. Lastly, the
Yamaha Motor , and the Honda Motor S.A, occupies respectively the 69thand 76thplace, with 99.3% and 100.0%
of their imports / purchases from Japan, France, and Netherlands (Yamaha), and Japan, Italy and Spain for
Honda . In particular, the evidence indicates that Japanese FDI stimulated the growth of exports. Thus, with
respect to trade regionalism also exerted a positive impact on trade and on the Japanese FDI in Portugal that can
be considered of horizontal FDI type (that tends to be market−seeking) and export−oriented as most of the
exportations go to European countries (OECD, 1999, p. 5, 16).
In the inverse case, the companies better represented in the 100 biggest import companies in Portugal, also
import their purchases from Japan, thus helping to improve the exports of the home country possibly with
intermediate inputs of the parent companies. A factor that contributed to this change was the EEC membership,
as the limited size of national territory and small population were obstacles for large / big companies. So,
Japanese companies aimed what has just been mentioned in the practice below (see Table 6).
According to the 1992 survey, it was asked to Japanese companies where they would sell their products if
they possessed bases in Portugal. Primarily, the response was the EEC. market as a whole (59.1%), followed by
the domestic Portuguese market. In second instance (23.0%), the re−exportation to Japan (9.8%) and lastly, the
sales would go to the Portuguese speaking countries (8.1%).
In 1999, the top list for destinations for the main products of Japanese affiliated companies in Portugal was :
first, others (including EU and EFTA markets) with 28.6%, second, Japan, Asia and North America with 21.4%
each. Hence, the Japanese market has grown in importance among the Japanese companies established in
Portugal. Therefore, Japanese FDI in Portugal became more mobile (export−oriented) than in 1992 when the
investment was more directed towards the domestic market regarding Japanese companies. This is increasingly
linked to related parts of the global company networks but not tied for market reasons to a particular country
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(JETRO survey, 1999, p. 28).
In the list of FDI in the Portuguese industry according to the 500 Best & Biggest companies established in
Portugal, for 1999 (EXAME , 2000, p. 136−153), most of the companies were in key industries with a large
numser of American and European multinationals. This can show that Japanese companies are among the ones
with better sales in the Portuguese market. This shows that Portugal is a good location for investment.
Accordingly, the company Salvador Caetano , with 27.0% in Toyota , ranked the 24th place in 1998 and 1999,
with sales of 86,216 thousand escudos and growth sales of 6.2%, followed by Mitsubishi Motors (trade
passenger cars) that from 1998 to 1999 recuperated from the 37th to 32nd place with sales of 70,417 thousand,
escudos and growth sales of 19.5% in one year. Whereas, Yasaki Saltano declined from the 47th to 59th place in
1999 with sales as of 42,767 thousand escudos, thus with negative growth sales −7.85%. The same happened to
Sony Portugal that lost eight places from 1998 to 1999, to the 77th position with sales of 33,203 thousand
escudos and negative growth sales of −0.97%. Mitsubishi T. Europe (transport equipment) raised one position to
the 79th place between 1998 and 1999, with sales of 32,304 thousand escudos and growth sales of 16.01%. In the
chemical sector, the CIRES also raised one position from the 161st place to the 160th place in 1999, with sales
totaling 17,119 thousand escudos and growth sales of 10.24%. The same cannot be stated about FISIPE that fell
50 places to the 350th place in the raking of the 500 Biggest & Best companies in Portugal, in 1999 . FISIPE
presented sales in the value of 9,359 thousand escudos and negative growth sales of −2.91%. In the trade sector
of motorcycles and passenger cars, Yamaha Motor Portugal occupied the 350th place in 1999 with sales of 8,764
thousand escudos, followed by Mazda in the 390th place with sales of 8,011 thousand escudos and growth sales
of 40.52% respectively. Next, the 394th place was occupied by Bridgestone / Firestone (trade) in 1999, with
sales totaling 7,971 thousand escudos and growth sales of 2.77%. The last Japanese company within the list of
the 500 Biggest & Best in Portugal is Honda Motor (trade passenger cars) that occupied the 409th place in 1999,
which represented a fall from the 389th place in the previous year with sales totaling 7,633 thousand escudos and
9.65% of growth sales.
Moreover, if comparing the numbers above with the list of the 500 Biggest & Best in the 1992 Survey,
presently, only 4 Japanese companies were listed : Toyota Motors (Salvador Caetano) in the 12th place,
Mitsubishi Portugal S. A. in the 69th place, Shinetsu chemicals with a 50.0% equity in CIRES in the 81st place,
and Yasaki Corporation in the 380th place in the list (J. I. C. A., 1992, p. 21). Yet, in the year 2000 list of the
500 Biggest & Best Companies in Portugal , it can be pointed out that the number of companies rose to 11
despite some of them have lost positions in comparison to 1998.
In addition, the companies already represented in the 500 Biggest & Best show that their investments in the
market are returning to a profit level and are securing a return on their investment. It is true that this is not a very
large number of companies compared to the Japanese presence in Europe. As a result, as some companies see
their volume of sales increasing, this can have the effect of a pull factor for them to decide for a second plant on
a strategy to set up bases inside European countries.
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4. Conclusion :
During the 1950s and 1960s, when FDI was still in its infancy, and even after, during the 1970s, Portugal
should have given more attention to its economic, cultural and political relations with Japan. If this had
happened, today the pattern of Japanese FDI would have been completely different. Of course, Portugal
dictatorial regime until 1974, the socialist regime, the political and economic instability until the mid1980s, as
well as, the better correlation between technology / industrialization in other European countries in comparison
to Portugal, explain the low volume of Japanese FDI in Portugal. Then, it must be acknowledged that Portugal
international relationships turned to be mainly focused to Africa, and then to Europe rather than Japan.
The attraction of Japanese investment must be faced within but simultaneously beyond the pure economic
sense due to different ways of living. The significance of infrastructures facilities as a determinant of FDI needs
no elaboration. Generally speaking, Portugal still lacks the sufficient infrastructures to have long−term Japanese
residents of de facto emigrants in Portugal. The ultimate determinant of who would stay and who would go
resides in the educational system that determines the existence or non−existence of skilled workers and
technological resources, thus contributing to the growth of productivity of labour. It is a fact that most of the
Japanese FDI has been always concentrated in the core countries of EU with better technological and
educational endowments than Portugal, and recently with the EU enlargement, Japanese investments have been
led towards the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). Just to mention an example, Poland and
Hungary, in 18 years (1981−1999) received 240 and 514 US$ million dollars respectively of Japanese
investment (OECD, 2000), whereas Portugal, in the period of 39 years (1960−1999) received 269 US$ million
dollars.
Nowadays, it is widely acknowledged that FDI can act as an engine of growth. Therefore, it is not astonishing
that most countries, whether developed ones, in development, or in transition, seek to attract FDI to promote
their economic development. Moreover, with the globalization of competition and the spread of information
technology, the comparative advantages are less immutable than before either in developing or in advanced
countries. Portugal must adapt rapidly to the globalization of competition. The enlargement of the EU towards
Eastern Europe emphasizes this particular case, and Japan being aware of this has not forgotten that region.
Nowadays, the decision to relocate different activities is based on a set of parameters, which define
competitiveness in the broadest sense : production and distribution costs, access to markets and to various kinds
of resources such as flexibility and quick response to changes in demand, organizational quality and human
resources. With the differential of real labour costs narrowing in EU countries, the labour costs become less
significant in determining the site of plants. As a result, there is a shift from geography of costs to geography of
skills (OECD, 1995, p. 54, 55). The integration into the EU of the new members (CEEC) will maintain and even
reinforce this level of competitiveness, expecting the increase of the existing levels of FDI.
In sum, Portugal besides the challenge imposed by the Asian NICs and the CEEC, is also penalized for its
insertion in the Iberian Peninsula. This disadvantage derives from the fact that for Japan’s MNC, it is better to
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establish the strategic−decision making center in Spain, closer to the center of Europe than to Portugal. For that
reason, Portugal’s smaller market and lower technological capacity becames a disadvantage in relation to its
neighbors. Consequently, Portugal is considered by Japan as a second option when considering a good location
for a second production plant inside of the EU. To raise its location advantages and reduce the gap with the
more advanced EU countries, Portugal must induce technology−related investment to improve the quality and
access of complementary assets, notably, technological capabilities of firms and the infrastructure conducive for
knowledge based economy.
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Analysis of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment
in Portugal and its Overseas Territories
Pedro Miguel Raposo de Medeiros Carvalho
This paper investigates the Japanese direct investment in Portugal overseas territories (or Provinces) and in its
mainland. It shows the impact of Portugal’s integration into the European Economic Community that after the
1980s has contributed to the boost of the Japanese direct investment in Portugal. In addition, this paper explains
the effects of Japanese FDI in Portugal through the affiliates regional sitting and typology in Portugal. Finally, it
takes into account the relationship between trade and foreign direct investments of the main Japanese trade
affiliate companies amongst the 100 biggest export and import companies established in Portugal in 1998 and
1999.
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